John English is the noted author of "On Infantry", which was a staple of professional military education in the U.S. and Canada for an earlier generation of officers. "The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign" is his 1991 detailed examination of the experience of the Canadian Army in the European Theater of Operations prior to and during the Normandy campaign. The crux of the book is the brave but uneven performance of Canadian units in the long struggle for the French city of Caen, a D-Day objective that was finally secured in mid-July.The book is subtitled "A study of failure in high command." English traces this failure first to the Canadian Army's fallow period between the two World Wars, when its leadership failed to prepare for a second general conflict. Second, he examines the training of the Canadian Army, once deployed to Britain beginning in 1940, in preparation for what became Operation Overlord. Third, he dissects the politics of the Canadian Army's leadership and its challenges in selecting and training its general officers for success on the battlefield.This is very much an "inside baseball" study of a military at war. There are frank and involved discussions of doctrine, training, and Army politics. Some of the chapters may not interest the general reader. The breakdown of the fighting in Normandy is a series of painful tactical lessons. The insights into the major personalities are revealing. Some of the conclusions remain controversial. Recommended to the student of the conflict as a very worthwhile study.